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In January 2017 several new decisions and 
resolutions on wildlife crime entered into force.1 
They were the core outcomes of the autumn 
2016 17th Conference of Parties (CoP17) 
of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES), hosted by South Africa. The parties 
agreed, inter alia, to toughen sanctions against 
those violating bans on illegal trade in ivory and 
rhino horn. The decision was a reaction to the 
dramatic rise in poaching and wildlife trafficking 
in recent years.2 
The new CITES resolutions confirm that 
poaching and wildlife trafficking should 
be considered as a form of transnational 
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organised crime.3 Similarly, recent reports from 
United Nations (UN) agencies, including its 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) and Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), observe that wildlife 
crime is on the rise in Africa, emphasising that it 
is best conceptualised as a form of transnational 
organised crime with considerable security 
implications.4 In INTERPOL-UNEP’s December 
2016 Strategic Report, 80% of governments 
surveyed stated that environmental crime was a 
top security priority.5 
The new recognition and framing of wildlife 
crime as both an environmental and a 
transnational security problem has at least two 
major implications. Firstly, the transnational 
dimension of wildlife crime implies that no state 
will be able to tackle it on its own. A coordinated 
international response is required, one that 
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focuses on trans-border and cross-jurisdictional 
collaboration and aims at integrating all 
relevant national, international and non-state 
actors in the coordination process. The lack 
of a coherent international approach to wildlife 
crime and the lack of capacity of most states 
have been identified as the core hurdles to an 
effective response to wildlife crime and improved 
conservation efforts. The complexity of the 
issue, its urgency and the range and number 
of actors involved require a rethinking of how 
responses to wildlife crime and conservation can 
be better coordinated.
Secondly, interpreting wildlife crime as a form 
of transnational organised crime also provides 
an opportunity. It allows us to learn from 
comparisons with other transnational crimes 
and how they have been addressed. We argue 
that significant insights can be gleaned from the 
international fight against Somali piracy. This 
response has not only been very successful 
but has also tested a range of novel forms of 
international coordination, which might provide 
new ideas for the fight against transnational 
wildlife crime.
In the next section, we outline the core 
characteristics of the international wildlife crime 
regime and the challenge of addressing it. We 
then summarise some of the core insights 
gleaned from counter-piracy strategies and ask 
how they might lead to new responses to wildlife 
crime. We conclude by discussing the role that 
South Africa could play in strengthening the 
Southern African response. 
Poaching and the international 
wildlife crime regime
The new political salience of wildlife crime 
has led to the emergence of an international 
regime dealing with the issue. CITES is still the 
cornerstone of this regime. It remains, however, 
an overly bureaucratic and formal organisation 
driven by diverse national interests, while lacking 
adequate means to ensure compliance with the 
rules it develops.6 CITES provides a baseline 
framework for how the 183 parties should 
regulate wildlife trade and of their commonly 
agreed limitations, such as in reporting 
stockpiles of seized ivory.7 However, as noted 
by Hübschle, ‘[a]s is the case with most other 
international conventions, there is little recourse 
to dealing with infractions or non-compliance 
by way of international enforcement’.8 In other 
words, the convention has limited bearing 
on non-compliant parties. Time will tell how 
the most recent CoP17 resolutions will be 
respected, applied and enforced.9 
CITES has been complemented with a range 
of initiatives by international organisations and 
non-state actors, which have started to address 
related issues, particularly the poaching of 
elephants and ivory trafficking. To understand 
the challenges that the regime faces, we 
firstly emphasise that wildlife crime is a multi-
dimensional problem that demands adequate 
definitions. Secondly, the multiplicity of actors 
involved means that the response to the problem 
will be complex and requires coordination. 
Poaching, as defined by Lemieux, is understood 
as ‘illegal taking’ of wildlife and plants protected 
by national and/or international laws and 
conventions. This definition provides a basis 
from which a more systematic and detailed 
definition of wildlife crime can be formulated.10 
The second part of the substrate – trafficking 
and trade – can be understood as illegal if 
conventions are breached.11 This, however, 
creates a conceptual challenge. Many agencies 
and states define wildlife crime differently.12 The 
lack of agreed definitions creates loopholes 
and provides opportunities for poachers and 
traffickers to ignore or circumvent the law. The 
consequence is poor law enforcement and 
illicit networks that include government agency 
officials or rangers; this creates a culture within 
which wildlife crimes are either not considered as 
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crimes or not effectively contested.13 Despite 
UNEP calling in 2014 for clarification on how 
the term should be conceptualised, by early 
2017 no unanimous or clear definition had been 
agreed on. 
What certainly challenges anti-poaching 
efforts is the lack of coherence in response. 
The number of actors involved has increased 
substantially in recent years: from myriads 
of non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
campaigns, through the development of 
militarised responses and pledges from African 
governments, to inter-governmental agencies’ 
agendas. A multi-dimensional approach 
to transnational cooperation has become 
necessary. All mentioned stakeholders, as well 
as those often excluded from the dialogue – 
local communities – will be required to actively 
participate in defining and combatting the crime, 
and putting real pressure on those who do not 
follow, enforce or support the efforts of the 
majority of engaged actors.
Recognising the importance of improving 
coordination, the international community in 
2010 established the International Consortium 
on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) with the 
Wildlife Enforcement Network as its executive 
arm. The consortium is composed of five 
bodies operating internationally and aims to 
‘bring coordinated support to national wildlife 
law enforcement agencies and the sub-
regional and regional enforcement networks 
that act in defence of natural resources’.14 
Since 2010 it has produced a healthy list of 
successes.15 One such effort is the development 
of a Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit 
through which the consortium offers tangible 
support to governments.16 However, a report 
from September 2016 revealed that only a 
few Southern African governments requested 
support and the implementation of the toolkit, 
and only Botswana fully implemented the 
programme in 2015 – this despite an official 
endorsement of the toolkit in the Southern 
African Development Community’s (SADC) Law 
Enforcement and Anti-Poaching Strategy.17 
Worth noting is that South Africa, which is home 
to 80% of the African rhinoceros populations, 
was in May 2017 still in a capacity-building 
phase.18 The biggest limitation of the toolkit 
is that its measures are non-obligatory.19 The 
CITES Standing Committee only recommends 
that states fully implement the proposals 
contained in the toolkit.20 The lack of support 
for the toolkit is at best a missed opportunity for 
an internationally coherent response. However, 
it also reflects the contested legitimacy of the 
consortium, suggesting its work might not be 
inclusive enough. We argue that several local 
initiatives should strengthen their coordination 
efforts, especially across the SADC region, and 
that outcomes should be closely monitored.21  
Other initiatives, such as the African Elephant 
Action Plan or the Elephant Protection Initiative, 
provide viable strategies for the region, but 
the absence of Southern African investment 
and an overarching implementation agreement 
threatens their success.22 Within the last two 
years, South Africa has started implementing 
an Integrated Strategic Management Approach 
that is yet to prove effective.23 The list of 
initiatives and projects is certainly much more 
extensive than can be presented here. Most are 
led by the wide range of NGOs now active in the 
field. The fact that poaching has not significantly 
decreased despite these interventions suggests 
that new strategies are needed, including those 
borrowed from elsewhere. In the next section, 
we discuss whether the response to Somali-
based piracy can provide fresh ideas.  
Lessons from the fight against 
Somali piracy
At first glance, piracy and wildlife crime have 
little in common. However, both are forms of 
contemporary transnational organised crime. 
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They are border-crossing phenomena, and 
perpetrators are organised in transnational 
networks that include local foot soldiers who 
commit the crime, international investors, and 
transnational financial flows.24 In addition, the 
same international actors invested in preventing 
wildlife crime, such as the UNODC or Interpol, 
are active in addressing piracy. Piracy and 
poaching are crimes that can arise and escalate 
quickly. Between 2008 and 2010 Somali piracy 
developed into a major international crisis, 
spurring the intervention of the UN Security 
Council. Similarly, the rapid increase in poaching 
and wildlife trafficking in the last few years, and 
in particular the growing number of warnings 
that wild African wildlife populations face 
extinction, suggests an emerging crisis.25 
Encouragingly, Somali piracy was quickly 
contained to reasonable levels. It took the 
international community less than four years 
– from the first UN Security Council resolution 
to the last known successful attack – to put in 
place a system that keeps pirates in check.26 
What were the ingredients of that system and 
could it be replicated to address wildlife 
crime? The Lessons Learned Project of the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia (CGPCS) provides good insight into 
the methods used; lessons that are relevant to 
tackling wildlife crime.27 
Firstly, in responding to Somali piracy, the 
international community took a focused 
approach. Within months after the first UN 
Security Council resolution, several states 
had created an informal coordination 
mechanism. The CGPCS was launched in 
early 2009 as an ad hoc informal coordination 
body that exclusively focused on piracy off the 
coast of Somalia. 
Secondly, the approach taken by the CGPCS 
was inclusive. A forum was provided in which 
all organisations active in and relevant to 
counter-piracy could participate and share their 
agendas, activities and analyses. This included 
representatives from states and international 
organisations active in counter-piracy, but also 
technical experts from implementing agencies 
such as the International Maritime Organization, 
UNODC and Interpol. Representatives from the 
regional and central governments of Somalia 
and from regional states such as Kenya and the 
Seychelles participated, as did representatives 
from the shipping industry and NGOs. It was 
recognised that piracy was a multi-dimensional 
problem that required different forms of legal, 
law enforcement, diplomatic and development 
expertise. The approach emphasised that 
a solution could not be found without close 
consultation with actors from Somalia and the 
East African region. 
Thirdly, the CGPCS was an ad hoc, informal, 
creative and very pragmatic forum that was 
willing to experiment with new ideas and 
strategies. The core objective was not to set 
up a new rule-based international organisation, 
grand strategy or action plan, but to identify 
pragmatic solutions to contain piracy. Rather 
than laying out rules and ensuring their 
enforcement, or negotiating legally binding 
documents, the focus was on information 
exchange, and on developing collaborative 
guidelines and concrete implementable projects 
in areas such as joint patrols and surveillance, 
capacity building, the handling of suspects and 
the regulation of private security providers. This 
approach kept big politics out of the discussion, 
helped avoid diplomatic pitfalls and focused on 
finding pragmatic implementable solutions. 
Fourthly, the immediate core priority of the 
group was to end a culture of impunity.28 
States arresting pirates had been unwilling 
to prosecute them. To respond to this 
problem, a sophisticated legal structure was 
developed within which the responsibility for 
arrest, prosecution and imprisonment was 
shared across jurisdictions. The structure 
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was implemented through Memoranda 
of Understanding between arresting and 
prosecuting states, legal capacity building, as 
well as the sharing of criminal evidence across 
different national law enforcement bodies. While 
this primarily addressed the arrest of pirates 
at sea, an informal Law Enforcement Task 
Force and an evidence-sharing centre were 
established to prosecute the financiers and 
backers of piracy. 
In following these principles, the CGPCS 
successfully orchestrated an international 
coordinated response, characterised by a 
close collaboration of naval forces and the 
shipping community at sea, as well as law 
enforcement bodies, and included capacity 
building in Somalia and the wider region. It was 
the focused, informal and creative approach of 
the CGPCS in orchestrating these activities that 
made the difference. 
The problem of wildlife crime differs from piracy 
in many important respects. The UN Convention 
of the Law of the Sea defines piracy to be a 
crime committed on the high seas, outside of 
national territories and jurisdictions.29 Moreover, 
the main country from which piracy operations 
were planned and conducted, Somalia, was a 
state with fragmented governance structures 
and limited sovereignty. Hence, in the case of 
piracy, sovereignty was less of a concern than 
would ordinarily be the case.30 This contrasts 
with land-based poaching, where multiple 
sovereign states, each with their own interests 
and jurisdictions, are involved. The piracy 
success story was partly a result of the sense of 
urgency with which the international community 
treated the problem. Because the UN Security 
Council saw piracy as threatening global trade 
and commerce, and as exacerbating insecurity 
in Somalia, it framed it as a priority issue.31 And 
while the UN Security Council has recognised 
wildlife crime as a problem and started to 
address it, it is unlikely that, in the current 
geopolitical climate, it will gain the momentum 
that piracy did.32 Wildlife crime does not threaten 
global commerce, nor are the primary victims of 
the crimes citizens of countries represented in 
the council. Finally, the security implications of 
wildlife crime are not straightforward. 
Piracy was addressed through a tailored mix 
of instruments, including naval forces, the 
regulation of the industry, private security 
providers, community engagement work 
and capacity building. Wildlife crime is 
undoubtedly different and will require a different 
set of measures. In particular, as various 
commentators have noted, the use of the military 
instrument and of private security providers is 
much more problematic, as it has the potential 
to exacerbate the human insecurities from 
which this crime develops.33 While the problems 
differ, and a different mix of tools is required, 
it is the principles of coordination and style of 
governance developed in the counter-piracy 
response that might steer the fight against 
wildlife crime in new directions. The Somali 
piracy case illustrates how well-tailored, 
pragmatic multi-stakeholder responses can 
make a difference in preventing wildlife crime. 
South Africa’s role and the redirection 
of the response 
The framing of wildlife crime has changed 
considerably in recent years. Because it cuts 
across borders and involves transnational 
criminal networks, many states have come to 
see it as a security issue. The consequences 
of this reframing, and what it might mean for 
how responses can be coordinated locally 
and nationally but perhaps, most importantly, 
internationally, are thus poorly understood. In 
this article we have shown that a global wildlife 
crime regime is evolving, but that it suffers from 
a lack of clear definitions and coherence. It has 
thus far failed to effectively reduce poaching 
and trafficking. 
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Lessons learned from responses to Somali 
piracy might provide a sense of direction here. 
Concentrating efforts by narrowing issues into 
manageable problems, adopting a pragmatic, 
informal approach rather than embracing 
rhetoric or drafting declarations and new rules, 
developing inclusive forums, and prioritising 
the end of impunity through innovative legal 
structures, are some of the principles that can 
be gained from the counter-piracy experience. 
How can these principles be translated into 
South African policies and the position it takes 
on the international stage? There are at least 
five possibilities: 
Strengthen leadership in multi-lateral 
forums and show a willingness 
to experiment
South Africa is not only directly affected by 
wildlife crime; it is also a regional powerhouse. 
Whether it engages as a regional leader or not 
makes a difference. Considering the important 
decisions taken at the CoP17, the fact that 
South Africa hosted it sent a strong message to 
the international community that it is willing to 
take leadership on the issue. 
Given the urgency of the situation, different 
mechanisms will be needed. South Africa is well 
positioned to initiate a forum, which, drawing 
on the core principles of counter-piracy, has 
the potential to offer remedies to wildlife 
crime. Inviting the international community to 
experiment in an ad hoc, informal and focused 
forum allows the development of pragmatic 
solutions outside the institutional politics that 
drive organisations such as the African Union 
and SADC. While African regional organisations 
are important political institutions, they are 
only one part of the puzzle. A broader, more 
inclusive forum provides the opportunity for 
pragmatic measures, developed under African 
leadership but with ensured buy-in from donor 
states, international organisations and NGOs. 
Work in an inclusive forum to clarify the 
role of different agencies
The plurality of actors engaged in the fight 
against wildlife crime has grown substantially. 
Working in an inclusive forum that brings all 
actors together allows for the clarification of 
roles and avoids duplication. A substantial 
part of the response to wildlife crime today 
is delivered by NGOs and international 
organisations, who often deliver their own 
version of conservation interventions, ranging 
from saving the survivors to proclaiming a war 
on poaching. Yet this work is often not well 
coordinated with that of state agencies. A better 
coordination of these actors and a sustainable 
dialogue would improve the response. An 
inclusive forum, similar to the CGPCS, might be 
a remedy for this situation. 
End the culture of impunity
South Africa needs to lead by example. A 
top priority should be to end the culture of 
impunity whereby poachers and members 
of their networks are not prosecuted. If law 
enforcement is not the only response, a viable 
starting point is to develop an international 
legal structure through which law enforcement 
agencies can cooperate, transfer suspects and 
share evidence and information. South Africa, 
so far, has not been particularly pro-active in 
the prosecution of poachers, and few of the 
organisers and traffickers have been arrested. 
Demonstrating its willingness to enforce the 
law, and accepting assistance from international 
bodies such as the ICCWC, will be important if 
it is to gain credibility. 
Recognise the link to corruption
Ending impunity also requires that more 
attention is paid to the role of corruption in 
wildlife crime. There is sufficient evidence that 
bribing rangers, border authorities, and local 
politicians and authorities is one of the core 
enablers of poaching. While there is no quick 
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fix to such corruption, by formally recognising 
its role in wildlife crime South Africa can 
ensure that more attention is paid to it, as 
already acknowledged in the Department of 
Environmental Affairs’ policy workshop, the 
Rhino Conservation Laboratory.34 
Work with and integrate communities
Finally, it is increasingly clear that one of the 
keys to successful anti-poaching policies is 
engagement with communities around wildlife 
reserves. South Africa could take the lead 
in exploring how such engagement is best 
coordinated, and how best practices are 
learned and reproduced. 
A comparison between wildlife crime and piracy 
reveals new ways in which the international 
response to wildlife crime might be redirected 
and better coordinated. We have argued that 
there is a clear set of principles that can be 
drawn from the fight against piracy, and which 
might prove useful. Quite obviously, wildlife 
crime and piracy differ, yet both are forms of 
contemporary transnational organised crime 
with considerable security implications. There 
is an urgent need for creative thinking and new 
governance solutions, given the rise in poaching 
and the decline of species.
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